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Abstract  
Thanks to sustained economic growth and key investments in military capabilities, India will face 
growing demands from within and the international community to seek and play a greater role in 
global security affairs. The values and interests likely to guide India’s future behavior will be a 
mixture of old and new, eastern and western. India’s international aspirations have an important 
pre-history, covered in this chapter’s first section where non-alignment, as idea and practice, is 
explored for its enduring significance. India’s relevance as a security actor is assessed in terms of 
its activities and capacity to influence developments within two security zones of major 
contemporary importance: Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. Finally, a section on the constraints 
and challenges examines India’s ability to navigate a multi-polar world, the fallout and gains of 
nuclearization, the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal, as well as ‘the weaknesses from within’ in terms of 
human security. 
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Introduction 
 
Since India gained independence in 1947 it has faced a number of military and security challenges 
from within South Asia and the neighboring region. One of the least economically integrated areas 
in the world1, South Asia hosts three nuclear weapon states: China, India and Pakistan. After four 
wars (in 1947, 65, 71 and 99) and a number of brinkmanship-style crises, India-Pakistan relations 
continue to be acrimonious, with some describing the rivalry as ‘conflict unending’ (Ganguly 
2002).  Despite the unstable regional environment2 India sought and succeeded in casting an 
international profile for itself. 
 
India’s international aspirations have an important pre-history, which will be covered in the first 
section, where the idea and practice of non-alignment is explored to highlight and explain its 
enduring significance in India. India’s relevance as a security actor will then be assessed in terms of 
its activities and capacity to influence developments within two security zones of major 
contemporary importance: Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. Finally, a section on constraints and 
challenges examines India’s ability to navigate a multi-polar world, the fallout and gains of 
nuclearization, the 2008 US-India civil nuclear agreement as well as ‘weaknesses from within’ in 
terms of human security. With sustained economic growth and key investments in military 
capabilities (see Tables 1 & 2 below for a comparative overview), India will face growing internal 
demands as well as from the international community to play a greater role in global security 
affairs. Nonetheless, there are a number of important impediments to India’s readiness and ability 
to take on responsibilities or to influence matters of global security.  
 
India is among the anointed ascendant powers also known as the BRICS countries3, of which China 
and Russia are also examined in this volume. The diffusion of power across the world tends to be 
identified through figures such as economic growth, trade balance and foreign exchange reserves 
(see for example National Intelligence Council 2012). Burgeoning centers of production in Asia, the 
rise of globally competitive companies from Asia are contrasted with sluggish economies in the 
United States and Europe, prompting scholars, analysts and policymakers to identify a tectonic 
shift in the global system. Publications have proclaimed the 21st century to be the Asian century 
(e.g. Asian Development Bank 2011). Others have explored sources of resilience in western ideas 
and institutions (Fukuyama 2012 or Ferguson 2012) or have depicted change as the ‘rise of the 
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rest’ (Zakaria 2012). Neo-realists are concerned with the implications of shifts in polarity 
(Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009) and the instability caused during a power 
transition. The liberal institutionalists instead highlight the challenges to finding a new global 
consensus on universal norms and codes of conduct (Moravcsik 2012). The former emphasizes 
security as a hard concept of military preparedness whilst the latter, draws attention to human 
security concerns related to terrorism, unsustainable development, internal conflict and 
humanitarian crises. India is central to both perspectives given its growing economy, the critical 
significance of India’s strategic behavior for the wider region, the strength but also weakness of 
the Indian state in the face of internal challenges and the resilience of its political system.  
 
Table 1: Military Capabilities 2012 – India, Pakistan, China and USA  
 
Sources: 
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2011), approximate estimates as of January 2011. 
2 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2012), 56, 234, 244, 272 
3Ibid., 57, 235-236, 244-245, 273.   
4Ibid., 63, 238, 246, 274.   
5 Ibid.,54, 233, 243, 272. 
6 (Central Intelligence Agency 2012), 2010 estimates. 
 
 
 
 India Pakistan China United States 
Nuclear Nuclear Weapons 1 
     (total: deployed & other) 
80 - 100 90 -110  240 8,500 
Army Main Battle Tanks 2 3,233 2,411   7,400  5,855 
Navy Submarines 3 15 8 71 71 
Principal Surface Combatants 3   
     (aircraft carriers , cruisers ,  
      destroyers , frigates)  
21 
(1 , 0 , 10 , 10) 
10 
(0 , 0 , 0 , 10) 
78 
(0 , 0 , 13 , 65) 
114 
(11 , 22 , 61 , 20) 
Air Force Aircraft (combat capable) 4 798 453 1,693 1,435 
Troops Active Troops (rounded) 5 1,325,000 642,000 2,285,000 1,569,000 
Paramilitary (rounded) 5 1,301,000 304,000 660,000 - 
Manpower fit for Military Service 6  
     (rounded)  
489,572,000 75,327,000 618,589,000 120,022,000 
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Table 2: Military Spending 1989 – 2011, India, Pakistan, China and USA  
 
Source: SIPRI (2012a). 
 
India’s Worldview 
 
Early foundations of independent India’s foreign policy 
 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, who led the country from 1947 to 1964 and 
simultaneously was external affairs minister, is considered the architect of independent India’s 
foreign policy. As a young man, Jawaharlal travelled widely and read and wrote extensively, 
especially during his long prison sentences in India, stimulating a strong interest in world politics 
and history (Nehru 1934). The violent partition that accompanied India’s independence, the first 
India-Pakistan war of 1947 /48 and subsequent impasse over Kashmir, were early shocks for the 
newly established nation4. While the relationship with Pakistan worsened, Nehru invested all his 
energies in improving relations with the newly established People’s Republic of China.  
 
Panchasheela or the five principles of peaceful coexistence were enshrined in an agreement 
between India and China in 1954. Nehru regarded this a crowning achievement of his diplomacy, 
earning him the credit of negotiating the first major international treaty with the People’s 
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Republic of China (Schöttli 2012, Chapter Six). While the treaty contained a preamble pertaining to 
Panchasheela it mainly succeeded in making India rescind all interests, claims or rights to Tibet 
and securing Indian recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. ‘Peaceful coexistence’ between 
the two giants enabled a brief phase of amity known as ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’ (“Indians and 
Chinese are brothers”) but was unable to prevent the 1962 border war and generated a Chinese 
claim over 33,000 square kilometers of land under Indian jurisdiction. 
 
Non-alignment, the central pillar of India’s Cold War foreign policy can be linked to Mahatma 
Gandhi’s ideas of self-reliance, non-violence and the pursuit of truth as the basis for action (Nehru 
1963). In his statements and speeches Nehru argued this was India’s only way of maintaining 
independence in a bi-polar global conflict. Non-alignment was not only driven by normative 
principles but also enabled India to receive aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union5. 
It is debatable whether non-alignment protected India and prevented South Asia from becoming a 
more contested arena. India’s desire to keep out the superpowers failed early on when Pakistan 
concluded a mutual defense treaty with the USA in 1954, nurturing close relations with both the 
USA and China. By 1971 Indira Gandhi signed a Treaty of Friendship with the USSR, which was to 
become India’s most reliable ally, calling into question, India’s ‘neutrality’ especially during the 
Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  
 
Within India, non-alignment served another important purpose of keeping the military in check. In 
reaction to Britain’s use of Indian armed forces during the 19th century and the two World Wars, 
independent India inherited an ambivalent attitude towards the use of physical power and force. 
Given Nehru’s solidarity with anti-colonial struggles6 it was important to demonstrate India’s 
credentials as peace loving and non-hegemonic. The defense budget was kept minimal and 
defense planning was non-existent, enabling China to quickly overrun Indian forces in 1962. 
Nonetheless, the decision to maintain a professional armed force (also a valuable employer) was 
never questioned and India early on became one of the biggest contributors to United Nations 
Security Council-mandated peacekeeping operations (Nambiar 2009). 
 
It could be argued that both non-alignment and Panchasheela were a failure given the inability to 
prevent major wars with India’s neighbors. In neither case did the Non-Aligned Movement play a 
role. Nor did Panchasheela earn India the trust and amity of smaller neighbors with whom 
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relations remained troubled and tense throughout the 1980s and even into the 1990s. Despite 
this, non-alignment and Panchasheela continue to resonate with the Indian and even international 
publics. In a post-Cold War World, India persists in promoting the Non-Aligned Movement7 and 
Panchasheela is mentioned in major speeches and at keynote events8. Some have argued that 
India suffers from a lack of strategic thinking (Tanham 1992) and unwillingness to assume a 
proactive foreign policy. Instead, India’s political culture predisposes the country to ‘muddling 
through’ or a preference for strategic ambiguity (Chaulia 2011, 27–28).  
 
Non-alignment 2.0: framing India’s Grand Strategy  
 
In January 2012 an unusual document was released in India entitled, “Non-alignment 2.0”, written 
by eight high-profile and influential thinkers – Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt 
Gen (Retd) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth 
Varadarajan. ‘Non-alignment 2.0’ seeks to identify the ‘basic principles’ guiding India’s foreign and 
strategic policy and to present a ‘re-working’ of the ‘fundamental principle’ of non-alignment. In 
their words, “The core objectives of Non-Alignment were to ensure that India did not define its 
national interest or approach to world politics in terms of ideologies and goals that had been set 
elsewhere; that India retained maximum strategic autonomy to pursue its own developmental 
goals; and that India worked to build national power as the foundation for creating a more just 
and equitable global order” (Khilnani et al. 2012, 8). 
 
Strategic autonomy, the authors propound, has and continues to underpin, India’s foreign and 
security policies (Khilnani et al. 2012, 6). However, why and whether ‘non-alignment’ is an 
overarching banner or the foundation stone for India’s policies in the 21st century is not explicitly 
investigated. After referring to non-alignment at the beginning, barely any mention of it is made in 
the report’s seventy pages. No empirical evidence is provided of when and how effectively, India 
has actually implemented non-alignment in the 21st century. Neither is the term examined in 
terms of its original application or theoretical potential as a normative framework for international 
relations more generally. Non-alignment is crucial to how the document is pitched but the 
arguments do not rest on a conceptual, empirical or theoretical application of the term.  
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Nonetheless the document is instructive particularly with regards the relationship between 
security and development that the authors construe. Very early in the document, the authors 
propound that “the success of India’s own internal development will depend decisively on how 
effectively we manage our global opportunities in order to maximize our choices—thereby 
enlarging our domestic options to the benefit of all Indians” (Khilnani et al. 2012, iii). In other 
words, development is projected as dependent on the success of India’s foreign policy – a 
recognition that global opportunities need to be managed opportunistically to deliver benefits at 
home and, a confirmation of the essential role that the state must play as mediator and manager 
of external events. At the same time, there is an additional dimension to India’s performance lying 
in its ability to act as an example, to provide a developmental model combining economic growth, 
social inclusion and political democracy.  
 
Development and security are therefore tightly inter-linked, one legitimating the other: ‘Enhance 
India’s strategic space and capacity for independent action – which in turn will give it maximum 
options for its own internal development’ is the justification offered by the authors, Khilnani et al. 
The treatise is a securitization of development for it proclaims how urgently developmental goals 
(not fully specified) must be pursued, how decisions taken now will have an irreversible impact on 
the future and that nothing must steer India off its course. The document proclaims that India can 
and should be a different kind of power, one that ‘sets new standards for what the powerful must 
do’. India’s national power will thus act as the foundation for creating a more just and equitable 
global order. 
 
The belief that India has an alternative to offer runs deep. Thanks to a legacy drawn from the 
freedom struggle, Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas and leadership, combined with Nehru’s extensive and 
erudite statements on international politics, India has actively sought to be a contributor to the 
ideas and practices of international politics. Non-alignment and Panchasheela are central 
examples, projected by Jawaharlal Nehru and his successors but there are others such as Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s proposed Action Plan for Nuclear Disarmament in 19889.  Translated into 
measures of actual influence, India’s room to maneuver on the global stage of diplomacy has been 
highly constrained not least due to a lack of hard power capabilities. Other factors include an 
unstable neighborhood which for much of independent India’s development, has been a primary 
security concern given that India shares borders with each of the South Asian countries, all of 
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them post-colonial states. See Table 3, below, for an overview of wars, conflicts and terrorist 
attacks affecting India. 
 
Table 3: Wars, Conflicts and Terrorist Attacks 
India versus Pakistan 
2002        Crisis along the border: Operation Parakram 
1999 Kargil War 
1990 Kashmir Crisis 
1987 Brass tacks Maneuvers 
1984 Siachen Glacier 
1971 Third India-Pakistan War 
1965 Second India-Pakistan War 
1947 – 1948 First India-Pakistan War 
1947 Partition 
Other international conflicts 
1987 – 1990 Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka 
1962 China-Indian Border War 
Internal Conflicts 
1988 –  Kashmir  
1983 – 2010 Assam 
1983 – 1993 Punjab 
1978 – 2009 Manipur 
1978 – 2006 Tripura 
1961 ‘Liberation’ of Goa 
1952 – 2007 Nagaland 
1948 Hyderabad police action 
1947 Junagadh Intervention 
Terrorist Attacks 
2008 Terrorist Attacks on Mumbai 
2008 Suicide bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul 
2007 Samjhauta Express bombings 
2001   Attack on the Indian Parliament 
Source: (Mitra 2011, 182) and (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 2012). 
 
With the fall of the Berlin wall and the Soviet Union’s collapse, India was faced not only with 
having to manage a severe balance of payments crisis in 199110 but also the diplomatic challenge 
of re-positioning itself in a newly configured global arena. To illustrate India’s recalibration of 
options and opportunities, the following section examines India’s response to two contemporary, 
global security challenges: how to stabilize and secure Afghanistan and the protection of sea lanes 
of communication and trade in the Indian Ocean.  
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India as global security actor 
 
India in Afghanistan 
 
The year 2011 marked a culmination in India’s involvement in Afghanistan. The signing of an 
Afghanistan-India Strategic Partnership was the first of its kind for Afghanistan and, in November 
2011 India attended the Turkey-hosted “Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia” conference 
with all regional stakeholders. The significance of these two events lies in India’s involvement and 
efforts to gain, establish and consolidate its foothold in Afghanistan to exert influence not only 
within Afghanistan but also beyond, into Central Asia. Including provisions for India to train and 
equip Afghan security forces, the partnership agreement called for closer cooperation on national 
security issues and enhanced prospects for regional economic cooperation.  
 
In recent years India has strengthened bilateral relations with Afghanistan and bolstered its 
position within multilateral arrangements. This marks a new phase in Indian strategic behavior as 
Indian diplomats, negotiators and decision-makers lobby across multiple fora. These include 
India’s presence at the various international conferences that have taken place with Afghan 
leaders in European cities over the past decade, the 2012 Tokyo donors’ conference and within 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations.  
  
India’s role and interests have often been sidelined despite pledging almost US$2.0 billion on 
various projects to emerge the fifth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan. For instance, at the 
2011 London conference the initiation of negotiations with the Taliban was announced, based on 
the ability to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban members. This was a policy turn that 
India was not in favor of, but which, in the end, it was forced to accept. Past US policy has 
regarded India to be a destabilizing factor given the suspicion and resentment aroused in Pakistan 
by every move and indication of Indian involvement (Hanauer and Chalk 2012, x). India’s efforts to 
become a full member (currently it has observer status) within the SCO have also been blocked by 
smaller members such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan expressing concern that India’s entry would 
require Pakistan’s and that the bitter rivalry would stymie the organization’s work. Numerous 
observers and analysts agree that the distrust and hostility between India and Pakistan is a major 
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obstacle to India consolidating its position in Afghanistan, a step that Pakistan regards in zero-sum 
terms11.  
 
India’s strategy towards Afghanistan has been two-fold: the use of soft power to win  
‘hearts and minds’ and to integrate Afghanistan into a regional network of trade and transport. 
Indian companies and the Indian government are building roads, providing medical facilities and 
spearheading educational initiatives. Projects like these are not without strategic interest such as 
the construction of the 218-kilometer long Zaranj-Delaram highway, enabling Afghanistan’s access 
to the sea via Iran and providing a shorter route for Indian goods to Afghanistan. India’s Border 
Roads Organization completed this major project in 2008. India was also the major promoter 
behind the initiative to make Afghanistan a full member of SAARC in 2007. Reflecting a general 
effort to enhance its soft power profile, the recently launched Indian Agency for Partnership in 
Development is slated to manage more than $11 billion in aid transfers to countries such as Burma 
and Bangladesh over the next five to seven years. 
 
While the consensus so far has been to avoid deeper engagement in Afghanistan, there are those 
who advocate a more assertive role, especially in order to secure the country’s single-most crucial 
goal, preventing Pakistan from regaining a central role in Afghan affairs (Pant 2011). Nevertheless, 
the likelihood of Indian military engagement is remote. India is far more likely to intensify 
diplomatic efforts to enhance its influence, in particular through regional players such as Iran and 
Russia. In this respect, India has shown persistence and skill in developing a wider Afghanistan 
policy to the extent that recently, it hosted Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and, an Iranian trade 
delegation on the same day in New Delhi.  
 
Turning to the Indian Ocean Region, one notices in India’s activities a similar ability to negotiate 
and navigate a variety of configurations.  
The Indian Ocean Region: Maritime Reorientations 
 
With the largest navy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India has taken important steps to 
consolidate its naval capabilities through strategic exercises as well as diplomatic initiatives 
(Brewster 2010). These include the decision to establish a central command on the Andaman 
Nicobar Islands providing India a stepping-stone into South East Asia (See Map 1 below). More 
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recently, plans have been implemented to develop new ports along the eastern coast and in 2009 
India unveiled its first indigenously designed and built, ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant. 
The Indian navy has been active in humanitarian and rescue operations, participating significantly 
in relief missions following the 2004 Tsunami disaster. In 2006, naval vessels evacuated more than 
2,000 Indian, Sri Lankan, and Nepali expatriate nationals from Lebanon during its war with Israel 
and 16,000 Indians from Libya in 2011. Furthermore, the navy has been involved in counter-piracy 
operations since 2008, with substantial deployments to the European Union-led Operation 
Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin.  
 
[Map 1: Indian Ocean Region] 
 
India’s new activism is understandable given that almost ninety percent of India’s oil needs are 
imported via the sea. Equally important, the sea-lanes to the Persian Gulf, Europe and East Asia 
are vital for the country’s exports. While China makes forays into the IOR through a rapid 
expansion of commercial and maritime ties with Bangladesh, Iran, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka, India has activated naval ties with Mozambique, Mauritius and the Seychelles. As part of 
its outreach to South East Asia during the 1990s (known as the ‘Look East Policy’), the Milan 
multilateral exercises were initiated in 1995 and since then institutionalized into a bi-annual event 
involving fourteen countries. In 2008 India proposed, and launched the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium, which meets regularly, bringing together navy chiefs from within the IOR. 
Complementing India’s new maritime thrust, in 1996 India was invited to join the security forum 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ERF) and in 
2005, the East Asia Summit process that focuses on political and security issues in Asia. In 2010, 
India participated in the first expanded gathering of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting.  
 
To date, India has been welcomed into multilateral arrangements and operations concerning the 
IOR. India has taken the initiative to create new institutions as well as breathe new life into 
existing ones, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), 
committed to upholding a system of open regionalism. However, as in the case of Afghanistan, 
Indian policymakers will have to make critical decisions about how to balance growing demands 
for Indian involvement with the reticence about displaying and exerting military power abroad as 
India develops global interests. Analysts have pointed out that, to operate in distant waters, the 
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Indian Navy will ultimately need operational facilities requiring special political relationships and 
military partnerships with the countries concerned. These were precisely the arrangements that 
Indian security advisors rejected during the Cold War and to which India objects when China seeks 
nodes of access into the Indian Ocean. 
 
India has shown its eagerness to participate in existing multilateral security initiatives in the IOR 
and the capacity to lead new ones. As in the case of Afghanistan, Indian diplomats can draw upon 
long traditions of historical interaction across a broad swathe of regions, from Central Asia to the 
expanse of littoral states within the Indian Ocean where India is generally regarded as a benign 
power (Brewster 2010, 16). India’s success at sustaining democracy helps to project India’s non-
hegemonic image and the political values of inclusion, consensus and pluralism that India has 
embraced. Undoubtedly, these are in need of continuous reaffirmation at home but act as 
compelling principles for India’s inter-state interactions12.  
 
 
Challenges and Opportunities  
 
India in a multi-polar world 
 
India’s ability to act on the global stage is molded as much by its will and worldview as by 
opportunities and constraints arising from developments within the country as well as externally. 
Integration into a globalizing world economy and the shedding of ideological determinants of 
foreign policy opened up new avenues of influence and interest for India. India’s economic 
reforms and thrust towards liberalization in the 1990s unleashed an economic dynamism enabling 
Indian companies to do business abroad and to attract foreign investments in India. Economic 
relations have become inter-linked with security considerations as India’s trade balance (see Table 
4) and energy needs have grown over time. As a result, while relations with major trade partners 
such as China and the United States have drastically improved over the last two decades, they 
have also been susceptible to critique and concerns within the domestic political arena.  
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Table 4: Socio-Economic Indicators for India, Pakistan, China and the United States 
 
1 In current US$ (Balance of Payments).  
2 % of population in multidimensional poverty. Data refer to 2003 (China), 2005 (India) & 2007 (Pakistan).  
3 The MPI is not available for states in the Top 20 of the HDI. 
Source: All data from (World Bank 2011). Except: Life Expectancy, HDI, GII and MPI from (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 2012); territory from (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2012). 
 
Washington has emerged as India’s major defense partner, and India conducts more military 
exercises with the US than with any other country. During the Cold War, India refrained from 
purchasing weapons from the United States but has since 2005 become a major buyer. The 2005 
framework agreement, which laid the foundations for the 2008 Civilian Nuclear Deal, defined a 
number of areas for cooperation including peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and maritime 
security, a departure from previous defense engagements which never specified joint political 
	
2011 India Pakistan China United 
States 
Gross Domestic Product  
  (billion US$) 
1,848 211 7,298 15,094 
GDP Growth    
  (annual %) 
6.9 2.4 9.1 1.7 
GDP per capita  
  (current US$) 
1,489 1,194 5,430 48,442 
Inflation, Consumer Prices  
  (annual %) 
8.9 11.9 5.4 3.2 
Foreign Direct Investment 2010   
  Net Inflows (billion US$)1  
24.2 2.0 185.1 227.9 
Trade in 1992 
  (% of GDP)  
18.1 30.5 36.1 20.8 
Trade in 2010   
  (% of GDP)  
54.5 32.3 55.8 29.0 
Life Expectancy at birth  
   (in years) 
65.4 65.4 73.5 78.5 
Human Development Index  
  (HDI) Rank (out of 179) 
134 145 101 4 
Gender Inequality Index 
  (GII)  Rank (out of 179) 
129 115 35 47 
Multidimensional Poverty Index   
  (MPI) Headcount of Poor (%) 2 
53.7 49.4 12.5 - 3 
Territory 
  (in thousand sq km, rounded) 
3,287 796 9,597 9,827 
Population 
  (in millions, rounded) 
1,241 177 1,344 312 
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missions. Economic relations have steadily improved, although bilateral negotiations are blocked 
on a number of controversial issues such as market access, intellectual property rights, high-
technology export controls and the US farm subsidy program. Despite a turnaround in Indo-US 
relations and the highly influential role that the Indian diaspora in the United States played in this 
process, the Indo-US relationship remains a politically sensitive issue within India. The Congress 
Party, main constituent of the ruling coalition, the United Progressive Alliance II, has not been able 
to develop a united position on relations with the United States. Tensions within the domestic 
political arena were high when the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal was being negotiated with parties 
on the Left and Right arguing that the deal threatened to curtail India’s freedom of action. Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh threatened to resign when the Congress party appeared to waver on 
the deal (Chari 2009, 1–17). 
 
Relations with China have witnessed an equally drastic transformation thanks to trade and 
economic interaction. Bilateral trade between India and China grew to $73 billion in 2011, up from 
$63 billion in 2010 and less than $3 billion in 2000. Both countries are targeting $100 billion by 
2015. However, in recent times India’s burgeoning trade deficit with China which is estimated to 
reach $60 billion by 2014-15, up nearly three-fold from $23 billion in 2010-11, has been receiving 
more critical attention. China is perceived as a ‘manufacturing threat’ to India and seen to be 
dragging its feet on enabling a diversification of Indian exports to China, especially in the areas of 
information technology, pharmaceuticals and engineering. Alarming figures are regularly 
published; such as a recent National Security Council (NSC) report, which projected that by 2014-
15, over 75% of India’s manufacturing will depend on China. In December 2011, the NSC and 
Ministry of Commerce initiated an action plan, involving inter-ministerial consultations from the 
ministries of industry, external affairs, telecom, information technology, pharmaceuticals, power 
and agriculture to produce a China-specific strategy.  
 
There is growing recognition that India must explore ways to enhance its leverage over China. An 
on-going border dispute, which receives constant media attention, producing at times, over-hyped 
reports, serves as a constant reminder of the national security threat that China could pose. It is 
not coincidence that in recent years, India has reached out to enhance economic ties with a 
number of South East and East Asian countries. In 2009 a Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (CEPA) was signed between India and the Republic of Korea and in 2011, a CEPA was 
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signed with Japan. At the same time, India has renewed efforts to woo South Asian neighbors. 
Following the success of the Sri Lanka-India Free Trade Agreement (in operation since 2000), 
concerted effort is underway to improve trade infrastructure and connectivity with Bangladesh 
(Government of India, 2012). Further to the east, Myanmar is a priority area for Indian investment 
in infrastructure and energy resources. On the occasion of Manmohan Singh’s visit to Myanmar in 
May 2012, the first Indian Prime Minister to do so in 25 years, twelve agreements were signed on 
diplomacy and trade.  
 
As India seeks to boost its exports, secure energy supplies and sustain economic growth, New 
Delhi will have to manage external relations in a way that does not stoke or succumb to nationalist 
sentiments. Relations with China and the United States have the capacity to produce strong 
political and public reactions. Apart from the domestic arena, India faces the opportunities and 
challenges of being labeled a “swing state” in the emerging international order (Mohan 2006). 
Most recently, in June 2012, American Secretary for Defense, Leon Panetta told a Delhi-based 
think tank that India is the ‘lynchpin’ for America’s re-engagement with Asia (The Times of India 
2012). Meanwhile, at the SCO meeting in Beijing, Chinese Vice Premier, Li Kequian, widely 
expected to be China’s next Premier, told Indian Foreign Minister, S.M. Krishna that Sino-Indian 
ties would be the most important bilateral relationship in the 21st century (Pandit and Parashar 
2012). While supporting multilateralism and a multi-polar world system would appear to be India’s 
first-order preferences, it remains to be seen how India plays its cards with regards the 
competitive rivalry between the United States and China.  
 
India - a revisionist power?  Nuclearization and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
 
Although most analysts and observers tend to portray India as a benign and generally stabilizing 
force, the decision to go nuclear in 1998 and the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal were regarded as 
dangerous and revisionist. Following the May 1998 nuclear tests, the Clinton regime responded by 
imposing economic and technological sanctions mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 
1994 and simultaneously initiated high-level talks to discuss possibilities of convergence in Indo-US 
economic and political interests. The timing of the tests has been as much debated as the 
consequences. With the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in power at the time, the nuclear tests were 
seen as a statement of strength and defiance by a resurgent Hindu-nationalist government. 
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However, relegating the tests solely to the logic of domestic political gain and nationalism unfairly 
neglects the strategic context within which India took this decision and makes light of the 
underlying cost-benefit calculations. Pakistan with a clandestine nuclear program and China with 
full-blown nuclear capability represented a highly asymmetric strategic environment for India. 
Furthermore, by 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was ready for signature, adding 
pressure on India to sign a treaty, which it perceived as unfair and incomplete with no time-bound 
framework for a complete elimination of nuclear weapons (Pande 1996).  
 
The 1998 nuclear tests were immediately followed by Pakistan’s own tests and shortly thereafter, 
the Kargil War on May 3rd and ending on July 26th, 1999. Fighting at very high altitudes along the 
Line of Control between India and Pakistan, casualties were sustained by both with ultimately no 
physical change of positions and India resuming control over its territory. Whether or not 
nuclearization encouraged Pakistan to act rashly or, proved to India that it could still win a 
conventional war as a nuclear weapon state, is the subject of much discussion and debate (Krepon 
2003). Since 1998, relations between the two countries have remained poor, with intermittent 
crises caused by acts of terrorism such as the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament leading India 
and Pakistan to mobilize almost a million troops on the border. Despite high volatility, both sides 
have developed Confidence Building Mechanisms to deal with their nuclear weapons and, 
following the most recent terror attack on Mumbai in 2008, New Delhi’s response was 
characterized by marked restraint. 
 
The 2008 Nuclear deal included an agreement by India to have all its civil nuclear facilities 
safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (fourteen existing thermal power reactors 
and all future civil reactors and breeders) until 2014. In return, the US agreed to relax the existing 
restrictions on export of technologies and materials (in place since India’s first test in 1974) for 
India’s civil nuclear program. Furthermore, Washington promised to lobby within the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) to generate an ‘India-specific exemption’, a waiver that was subsequently 
approved in September 2008. All forty-six NSG member states are now allowed to engage in civil 
nuclear business with India.  
 
Three major criticisms were launched against the waiver: that it would trigger a new nuclear arms 
race in South Asia; that it undermined global nuclear disarmament efforts and, irreversibly 
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damaged the Non-Proliferation regime. However, from an Indian perspective, the Non-
Proliferation treaty was an inherently unequal treaty. Furthermore, both China and the US who 
have yet to ratify the CTBT which outlaws nuclear testing, were two countries India had reason to 
be wary of given that it fought a war with China in 1962 and the United States’ close support of 
Pakistan. With India’s clean record on proliferation, it has also been pointed out that the 
safeguards included in the nuclear deal could help India grow accustomed to international 
controls, paving the way to a less principled opposition to the Non-Proliferation treaty (Rauch 
2010). Analysts have further argued that while India is dissatisfied with key elements of the Non-
Proliferation regime, it does not fundamentally oppose it (Paul and Shankar 2007).  
 
South Asia remains a strategically unstable area thanks to the India-Pakistan conflict, the border 
issue with China and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Through its ‘all-weather friendship’ 
with Pakistan, China is party to the South Asian security dilemma whilst India and China have not 
made headway on reaching a sustainable resolution. China’s activities in India’s near 
neighborhood such as developing the Pakistani port of Gwadar into an access point for the Indian 
Ocean, infrastructure investments in Burma are regularly referred to as China’s ‘string of pearls 
strategy’ in Delhi. More recently, there have been reports of Chinese attempts to persuade the 
King of Bhutan to concede territory that would threaten India at its strategically important Siliguri 
corridor. The decision to develop and test missiles, most recently Agni V in April 2012 and India’s 
first intercontinental ballistic missile; India’s becoming the largest importer of arms13 have to be 
seen in context of India’s difficult strategic environment and as part of an effort to fast-track 
modernization of the Armed Forces14.  
 
Human Security at home: India’s Achilles’ Heel? 
 
Terrorist attacks and inter-community conflict continue to occur and represent a major concern 
for the Indian government, leading some analysts to label India a ‘soft state’. However, India’s 
diversity is well represented through 22 official languages recognized in the Constitution and the 
28 states that contain numerous crosscutting ethnic and religious identities. A carefully designed 
and flexible federal system has helped New Delhi to contain and address sub-national grievances. 
Nevertheless, there have been controversies over the abuse of security provisions, for example 
over the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. Further potential for instability arises from instances 
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where internal migrant communities have been made targets of politically motivated attacks (for 
example the anti-Northern campaign in Maharashtra or recent anti-Muslim violence in the North 
Eastern State of Assam). While these have generally remained isolated outbreaks, they are a 
threat to law and order, requiring a calibrated response from state authorities to avoid escalation 
or retribution in other parts of the country. 
 
Alongside India’s high growth rates are a number of dismal facts relating to human development. 
Whilst India’s democracy has proven its resilience over the past six decades and an impressive 
ability to accommodate diversity while granting an array of freedoms, it has not been effective in 
tackling a number of governance-related problems. Regarding the human development index 
(HDI) with its three dimensions of health, education and living standard, India performs worst 
compared to its BRICS peers.15 In several indicators for health, education and living standard the 
poorest Indian states are comparable to states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Then again one has to keep 
in mind the immense diversity of India as a subcontinent. For the range of human development – 
from the impressive human development achievements of states like Kerala to the specific needs 
(e.g. child school attendance, mortality, nutrition or sanitation) in mega-states like Uttar Pradesh 
(with nearly 200 million citizens) or Bihar (with more than 100 million citizens) see Table 5.  
 
The Indian case implies a clear link between human development and security. The majority of the 
states with so called “Left Wing Extremist” (LWE) affected districts, meaning districts with Naxalite 
operations, are in the lower part of the human development spectrum, with proportions of people 
living in multidimensional poverty of up to 81% in the case of Bihar (see states marked with * in 
table 5). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that the Maoists constitute "the single biggest 
internal security challenge ever faced by our country." This led to the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) 
to foster development in 60 tribal and backward districts in LWE affected regions. A special LWE 
scheme was introduced within the Security Related Expenditure (SRE). Under this scheme, 
financial resources spent in states on anti-naxalite operations and improvement of security-
related infrastructure, are reimbursed by the Indian government. (Government of India - Ministry 
of Home Affairs 2010) 
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Table 5: Multidimensional Poverty Index for Indian States 
 
* States with “Left Wing Extremist” affected districts included under Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme 
(Ministry of Home Affairs 2010). 
1 “The proportion of MPI poor population is estimated using the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) dataset 
2005-06, which has a slightly different distribution of population across states.” (OPHI 2010, 6)  
2 Till 2006 called Uttaranchal.  
3 Eastern States include Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and 
Tripura. (OPHI 2010, 6) 
Source: all MPI data from Alkire and Santos 2010, 124–25; population figures from Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of India 2012. 
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1    Delhi   16.8 0.062 14 4 9 7 9 0 10 3 2 5 6 
2    Kerala   33.4 0.065 16 1 7 4 12 5 4 9 3 15 11 
3    Goa   1.5 0.094 22 4 9 4 16 2 16 10 12 17 12 
4    Punjab   27.7 0.120 26 8 13 9 17 2 20 1 16 23 11 
5    Himachal Pradesh   6.9 0.131 31 4 7 9 25 1 28 8 15 29 20 
6    Tamil Nadu   72.1 0.141 32 9 8 11 21 7 31 5 12 30 24 
7    Uttarakhand2 10.1 0.189 40 8 10 15 30 15 33 10 30 37 27 
8  *Maharashtra   112.4 0.193 40 8 15 14 30 13 36 8 27 34 28 
9    Haryana   25.4 0.199 42 8 20 15 30 8 34 8 24 39 25 
10    Gujarat   60.4 0.205 42 12 13 17 33 9 36 10 24 36 29 
11    Jammu & Kashmir   12.5 0.209 44 8 22 16 27 5 40 17 28 39 27 
12  *Andhra Pradesh   84.7 0.211 45 19 13 16 29 8 41 6 19 42 35 
13  *Karnataka  61.1 0.223 46 12 21 17 33 8 41 12 19 42 32 
14    Eastern States3   45.6 0.303 58 19 21 19 37 41 45 23 50 55 42 
15  *West Bengal   91.3 0.317 58 25 23 19 42 41 47 7 48 57 43 
16  *Orissa  41.9 0.345 64 23 19 24 45 43 62 20 51 63 49 
17    Rajasthan   68.6 0.351 64 21 32 28 44 31 60 24 36 61 47 
18  *Uttar Pradesh   199.6 0.386 70 18 36 37 46 48 62 7 58 66 41 
19  *Chhattisgarh   25.5 0.387 72 21 29 31 52 24 69 22 64 70 48 
20  *Madhya Pradesh   72.6 0.389 70 22 32 31 50 25 65 31 57 67 52 
21  *Jharkhand  33.0 0.463 77 26 45 30 56 55 73 42 63 76 55 
22  *Bihar 103.8 0.499 81 35 52 35 61 65 74 4 70 79 57 
  India    0.296 54 18 25 23 39 29 49 12 40 52 38 
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Conclusion: India’s emerging global profile 
 
Both of India’s major political parties, the Indian National Congress and the opposition, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party have endorsed the aspiration to great power status16. Economic growth, 
military modernization and effective diplomacy have buttressed the country’s ascent over the past 
two decades. (see Table 4). The recognition of India’s position and relevance is evident from the 
numerous official visits paid by leaders of major economies and the growing number of security-
related agreements that have been signed. India has entered into numerous bilateral agreements, 
especially within South East Asia and enhanced its visibility and presence within multilateral 
organizations such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.  
 
In terms of developing its role as a global security actor, India has the aspirations, to a large extent 
the capabilities, but not yet the trappings of a great power. That India is not a permanent member 
of the United Nations Security Council is a fact that rankles, and various strategies have been 
adopted to push for reform. As a member of the ‘G4 nations’ India worked together with Brazil, 
Germany and Japan supporting each other’s bids for permanent seats. Despite President Obama’s 
support for India’s candidature, announced during his visit in November 2010, India’s efforts have 
been futile. Not willing to bandwagon with the United States, India maintains that the pursuit of 
‘strategic autonomy’ is the prime rationale behind its foreign policy.  
 
Given India’s commitment to the norms of peaceful international discourse, critics have pointed 
out that India is the only major democracy aside from the United States, not to have ratified the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This is a decision that reflects an innate Indian 
defensiveness regarding its sovereignty but also a confidence in the strength of its own legal 
institutions. As India seeks to take on a greater global profile, the commitment to universal norms, 
of how to define them, when and how to uphold them, are bound to create situations and raise 
debates that will draw out ambiguities and tensions17. This was the case during the Libyan crisis, 
which occurred while India was a non-permanent member in the Security Council.  
 
As the crisis developed in early 2011, India’s first concern was for the safety of its citizens working 
in the region. On February 26, 2011 India voted in the UNSC for resolution 1970 which condemned 
the use of force by the Gaddafi government against its own people and imposed international 
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sanctions on Libya. Furthermore, the resolution unanimously referred Libya to the International 
Criminal Court. This appeared to mark a shift in Indian policy, one that hitherto had been critical of 
the ICC. However, on March 11, 2011 the Indian government appeared to revise its position when 
it abstained on UN resolution 1973 providing the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan 
war. Various interpretations have been offered of this decision. These included the need to avoid 
antagonizing Muslim sentiment (outside but also crucially, within India), practical arguments 
based on the lack of information available to the world at that point, claims that intervention in 
Libya was an act of Western neo-colonialism and even that India needed to curb its own great 
power aspirations so as not to appear as aligning too closely with the West. Each reflects 
sentiments and political positions that have developed within India over many years, drawing 
upon the country’s historical experience and the dynamics of a difficult regional context.  
 
This chapter has sought to highlight the particular worldview and pattern of external interaction 
that India has evolved over the last six decades. A nation state that is well accustomed to the need 
for accommodation and consensus and, one that is rightly proud of its institutions promoting 
participation, accountability and legitimacy, India would ideally like to lead by virtue of its 
example. Recognizing the failings in its example, human security is a top priority and the object of 
manifold government-sponsored programs aimed at social and human development. Domestic 
stability and welfare, nevertheless, are therefore bound to be central concerns in New Delhi for 
many years to come.  
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Notes 	
1 Market integration in South Asia is the lowest in the world. Intra-regional trade between countries 
accounts for less than 2 per cent of GDP for South Asia, compared with 40 per cent for East Asia. 
2 Following the 1971 War of Independence, Bangladesh was created out of the Eastern wing of Pakistan 
and in the 1980s Sri Lanka was consumed by a virulent Civil War. 
3 Coined by Goldman Sachs chief economist, Terence James O’Neill (2001) in his paper “Building better 
global economic BRICS”, to depict the rapidly developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Since 
then South Africa was added to the group. 
4 Having referred the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations in 1948 Jawaharlal Nehru felt betrayed when 
Security Council members showed sympathy for Pakistan’s defense (Wolpert 1996, 433–35). 
5  Despite leaning towards the Soviet Union through the friendship treaty of 1971, India avoided 
undertaking joint exercises or other service to service contacts with Moscow (Singh 1986). 
6 Nehru oversaw the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi (1947) and was a central promoter of the Bandung 
Conference of Afro-Asian solidarity (1955). 
7 See Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Reports. 
8 A flurry of Panchasheela -related events occurred in 2004 to mark its fiftieth anniversary, despite the fact 
that the 1954 treaty lapsed in 1962 and has not been renewed. 
9 Tabled at the United Nations the Plan proposed a three-stage process of total disarmament via a regime 
that was global, universal and non-discriminatory. It was one of the earliest initiatives for nuclear 
disarmament.  
10 In 1991 the Government of India was close to a default and reportedly had foreign reserves to barely 
finance three weeks of imports. The crisis forced India to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund 
for an emergency loan and paved the way for a wave of liberalizing reforms of the economy.  
11 In Afghanistan India has been accused of aiding separatist movements amongst Balochi Nationalists. 
India has opened four consulates in Afghanistan, in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar which 
Pakistan claims are not simply for visa-issuing purposes. Since 2006, India has deployed its own paramilitary 
force to guard its workers in Afghanistan, and opened negotiations to establish its first military airbase 
overseas in Tajikistan. 
12 Sanjaya Baru, one-time media advisor to the Prime Minister, sought to develop what he termed the 
‘Manmohan Singh Doctrine’ based upon these principles (Baru 2008). 
13 According to the SIPRI report published in March 2012 India became the largest importer of arms during 
2007 – 2011 (SIPRI, 2012b). 
14 See for instance, the 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and five-year Services Capital 
Acquisition Plan and Annual Acquisition Plan. 
15 HDI Ranks of Russia (66), Brazil (84), China (101), South Africa (123) and India (134) (UNDP 2012).  
16 In 2006 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed this in an interview: “Charlie Rose Interviews PM 
Manmohan Singh.” Council on Foreign Relations, February 27, 2006. 
https://secure.www.cfr.org/publication/9986/charlie_ rose_interviews_indian_pm_manmohan_singh.html 
(accessed January 19, 2013). 
In 2004, the BJP’s election campaign explicitly pledged to make India a “great power” by 2020: Bharatiya 
Janata Party, “Vision Document 2004,” March 2004, 
www.bjp.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=136&Itemid=548 (accessed January 19, 
2013). 
17 For an example of India’s position on the Responsibility to protect see Hall, Ian. 2013. “"Tilting at 
Windmills?" The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect after UNSC 1973.” Global Responsibility to 
Protect, 5:1, pp. 84–108	
